Can corporate tax fund a world with less work?
The available data help frame the question, but do not yet provide a causal answer or guarantee tax revenue.
A statistical association between tax rates and revenue does not establish how much a future tax increase would raise.
What has been tested?
Step 59 compares panel specifications across 38 countries and 905 overlapping country-year observations, using current and prior-year tax rates with growth and inflation. Existing research records, not a live update.
What can we learn?
When current and lagged tax rates are included, the current-rate coefficient is about 0.0504 percentage points of corporate-tax revenue relative to output for each percentage-point increase in the statutory rate. Its reported confidence interval excludes zero; the lagged-rate interval includes zero. The result warrants further testing, but does not establish causation.
Why not use this coefficient directly in the budget calculator?
Governments may adjust taxes in response to economic conditions. Profitability, tax-base reforms and international profit shifting may change at the same time. Adding a time lag does not solve the causal-identification problem.
What are the limits of the research?
Step 61 screened 201 tax-rate changes and found 25 isolated candidates. No event-study effect or fully reviewed control assumptions. Step 62 examined before/after profiles: five tax increases averaged about 0.0573 percentage points of output in revenue change one year later, but leave-one-out means range from −0.0800 to 0.3299. Sensitivity range, not a confidence interval; no control group in step 62. Step 63's stricter stability/support filters retain 6 events, including two increases. Descriptive feasibility only; control candidates lack institutional approval and 19 events await source review. Step 64 finds accompanying policy packages and anticipation risk in the two retained increases; comparison countries are not clean controls. Step 65 downloaded 12,653 Korean company-years, allowing a descriptive pilot but not a verified actual tax base for reform exposure. Step 66 found accounting reconstruction gaps and paused the pilot. Step 67 reconstructed tax ratios in two original separate-statement cases and rejected treating tax as cash paid. Step 68 expanded to six observations: prior-year inputs and numeric precision explain many gaps, but exceptions and processing definitions remain unverified. Step 69 reconstructed remaining leverage/size exceptions using observed bounds: a post-hoc numeric explanation, not independent pipeline validation. Statement checks reached nine observations across three companies. Step 70 completed a limited public-statement pilot showing tax-expense/cash-payment differences and weight sensitivity. Fiscal calibration remains blocked.
Sources and transparency
This publication explains the existing research in accessible language. Its accounting example and scenarios are neither official forecasts nor investment recommendations.
- Step 69 — explaining exceptions and expanding report checks ↗
- Step 68 — extended verification and prior-year variable checks ↗
- Step 67 — sample verification against original reports ↗
- Step 66 — index reconstruction and remaining discrepancies ↗
- Step 59 — specifications, coefficients, confidence intervals and warnings ↗
- Step 61 — tax-event screening and identification limits ↗
- Step 62 — results, sensitivity checks and limitations ↗
- Step 62 — profiles and reproducible sensitivity data ↗
- Step 63 — event review, control candidates and limitations ↗
- Step 63 — comparison rules and source registry ↗
- Step 64 — accompanying policies and comparison countries ↗
- Step 65 — downloaded data, availability and identification limits ↗
What do you think?
Which benefit-funding risk matters most: a shrinking tax base, profit shifting or slower growth?